

SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: The HATTORI Nets in Hokkaido Report No. ZJL-716 (FD-345)

Date of Information: As stated

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: As stated

Evaluation: C-3 except as stated

Date of Report: 2 January, 1951

Source: []

1. A series of briefings were given to HARUKE Yoshitane by the various members of the HATTORI Takanobu Group in mid-October, 1951, previous to HARUKE's trip to Hokkaido which was to be for the purpose of taking over charge of both the intelligence net and the rearmament planning activities of HATTORI's colleagues there. When HATTORI Takanobu definitely decided in mid-October that HARUKE should take over leadership of both the Hokkaido colleagues ("dachi") and the Hokkaido intelligence net as well, he called HARUKE and Source to his home. HATTORI intended to have former Lt. Colonel MIZUNACHI Katsushi, whose duty it is to check, confirm, edit, and process various information reports brought to HATTORI from Hokkaido, brief HARUKE on the situation in Hokkaido. At that time, however, MIZUNACHI was bedridden with a cold, so Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO Naokatsu, who had formerly handled such duties for HATTORI's organization, gave the first briefing instead. This was followed by a general briefing by HATTORI himself on the Hokkaido situation and the JCF in general. These two briefings have been previously reported. Although it was completely unnecessary for Source, who is not part of the organization but had merely recommended HARUKE for the post, to be present at the first two briefings, HATTORI, for some unknown reason, included him on both occasions. It seemed to be because HATTORI and Source are intimate friends and the latter had established the original professional contact between HATTORI and HARUKE Yoshitane, or it may have been a matter of the degree of trust placed by HATTORI in Source. However, both HATTORI and HASHIMOTO appeared to be lacking in memory of necessary details concerning the most recent information on Hokkaido and JCF-Soviet activities regarding that area. HATTORI promised HARUKE the night of the second briefing that he would have MIZUNACHI give a detailed explanation of the situation as soon as the latter had recovered. Several days later, MIZUNACHI did brief HARUKE, without either HATTORI or Source present. HASHIMOTO was also present at this third briefing.

2. Then, just before HARUKE left at the end of October, 1951, former Lt. Colonel FUJIWARA Iwaochi, another member of the HATTORI Intelligence Organization who temporarily assumed charge of making contact between Source and HATTORI on his own initiative, gave HARUKE a separate briefing. FUJIWARA was on duty in the India Theater during the war and was a high-ranking operations officer of the HIKARI Kikan at the time. During part of his career there, he was therefore under the command of IWANUBO Hideo & Go, then chief of the HIKARI Kikan (1941-43), and later under IMAKURO's trusted deputy, KAGAMA Yoshio. From March to May, 1946, during the same time that KAGAMA and Source were confined together in a British prison at Singapore, FUJIWARA was in the same compound.

Classification: []

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

Security Information
-2- (ZUL-74; PR-145)

Source has a low estimate of FUJIWARA's character despite the latter's fine mind and operational ability, and also doubts whether FUJIWARA really intends to cooperate with HATTORI or not. Although HATTORI claims that he is not completely satisfied himself with the character of FUJIWARA Isamu, HATTORI highly praises the latter's intelligence ability and activities on their behalf. HATTORI told Source that he has given FUJIWARA specific directives on what information he wants gathered concerning Hokkaido, from that sources FUJIWARA gets the raw intelligence to fulfill those directives. HATTORI claims he does not know, but they are in any event separate from the main HATTORI sources in Hokkaido, which had been described by KASEI-OZO, MIZUNAGI, and HATTORI.

3. FUJIWARA is fairly closely related to a certain ~~CHAI~~ (), who is chief of the General Affairs Section of the Hokkaido Government, and FUJIWARA gave HIRUMI an introduction to ~~CHAI~~ and KOGURE TOSHIRO (). ~~CHAI~~ is the Governor of Hokkaido, who has organized the Hokkaido Defense Research Committee for investigative and rearmament research purposes. FUJIWARA had a great interest in ~~CHAI~~'s trip and claimed to welcome him eagerly as "another real professional". HIRUMI was asked to keep details of this fourth explanation even from HATTORI, and there seemed to be no knowledge nor desire on HATTORI's part that the briefing by FUJIWARA was given to HIRUMI at all. (Sub-source for para. 3)

4. HIRUMI was apparently not very interested nor concerned with details of the third briefing from KASEI-OZO and MIZUNAGI. Since both had formerly been his subordinates, MIZUNAGI for quite some time directly under him, HIRUMI took considerable time during the proceedings in airing his own opinions. These opinions were on world conditions, Japanese rearmament, and the HATTORI Group itself; HATTORI gave them some very frank and direct criticism and advice concerning the last point in particular, and asked them to reflect a bit on the degree of professionalism which the group possessed in its intelligence-gathering activities. Therefore, although HIRUMI was given the "Chart of the Military Situation of Soviet Russia" (Cf. Attachment A) at this time and MIZUNAGI intended to elaborate upon it in his briefing, HIRUMI gave him very little chance to do so. (Sub-source)

5. Source comment concerning the third briefing and Attachment A. Because of HATTORI's lordly attitude towards his former subordinates apparently, details of the third briefing were not divulged. It is possible but unlikely that HIRUMI did get more details but concealed them from Source; the account is too much in keeping with his attitude toward the HATTORI Kikan and his future duties as well. If HATTORI's usual practice regarding such information has been followed, the chart (given in Attachment A) was prepared by the HATTORI Kikan on the basis of their Hokkaido information and then presented by HATTORI to O-2 GHQ. There is no confirmation of this, however, and it is quite possible that the chart has not yet been presented to GHQ by HATTORI. Nor is there any definite proof that the chart was actually prepared by the HATTORI Kikan itself, although it seems most likely that the information for its preparation came from the main segment of HATTORI's Hokkaido sources, under HATTORI and TAKUMI, and that it was prepared by the desk officers for such information gleaned from another "kikan", or actually prepared by another "kikan", or an information broker and obtained from those sources by the HATTORI Kikan. Consequently, the first point of check is thorough investigation of whether

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HATTORI actually has submitted these charts in his various reports to O-2 GSC and whether he describes the source of the information and charts and if so, how.

6. According to the outline of the topics of the fourth briefing, which is given below, FUJIMURA apparently went into considerable detail in his explanation of JCP and Soviet activity in Hokkaido, and supplied considerable information additional to what HATTORI and HASEGAWA had given. However, HASEGAWA expressed very little interest in what FUJIMURA had to offer, and was apparently quite indifferent according to his own admission, because he has a very low opinion of and aversion to FUJIMURA's personality. As a result, he was unable to reproduce FUJIMURA's verbal briefing given on the basis of the written outline. The written outline, which was handed to HASEGAWA by FUJIMURA for his convenience, was as follows:

OUTLINE OF BRIEFING EXPLANATION ON THE JCP

a. Outline Points

1) Regional Units

The North District, one of the five major operational districts of Japan, is divided into three areas (or sub-districts):

1. Geographical:

Area #1. Hokkaido—(HQ at) Sapporo
Area #2. Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Iwate—(HQ at) Akita City
Area #3. Miyagi, Fukushima, Miyagi—Sanki City

2. Military: In the event of war, the Hokkaido and entire Tohoku District is to be turned into Soviet territory for purposes of the Soviet's military operations for Japan.

2) Leaders

1. Leaders:
MITSUOKA Mitamura (日本三浦) (1)
SUZUKI Tokuo (日本鈴木) (2)
2. Leaders: (日本领导人) (Korean?)
Present State: (日本领导人)
FUJIMURA Jiro (日本三浦) (3)
KUNIT (1ml), ideological leaders, assisted by nineteen committee members
of whom half are now in hiding or are missing, plus
SEKIGUCHI (1ml), connected with the National Railways Union clique in
the Obihiro area.

3) Membership

The JCP membership in Hokkaido is 2,700, including official, overt, and covert members. Followers-travellers recognized as such number about 10,000; workers and groups adhering to farming area agitators and propagandists susceptible to the influence of the JCP however, total about 200,000.

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4) Areas Where JCP Activity is Intense.

The YAMAKAWA Area, centering around ISARAKAWA (石狩川),
The SORACSI Area (宗谷川), chiefly IMIZAWA (今沢),
for the coal-mining districts.
The ISHIKARI (石狩川) Area, centering around Sapporo, for the
agricultural districts.

5) General.

As a whole, there exists no cross-sectional contact and coordinated
collaboration between each area and district. As slogans and catch
propaganda of the JCP in Hokkaido, emphasis is brought to bear upon
the cultivation of lands belonging to absentee landlords and upon the
monopoly of capitalistic firms there. Twenty families of farmers at
Anashio and Hokuto villages are Communist. However, if their living
standards were raised a bit, they would be freed from Communist influence.

b. Special Intelligence Operations of the JCP, Communist China, and Russia
for an Attack.

1) Raid Zones (for quick-landing attacks) in Hokkaido

Six major districts:

- 1) Eishigari-Karikawa District
- 2) Hakodate District
- 3) Ashiburi District
- 4) Nemuro District
- 5) Kushiro District
- 6) Oobirto District

Four Specific Points or Areas of Attacks.

Otaru, Muroran, Anashikawa, and Wakkanai.

2) Raiding Spots in the Middle Area of Hokkaido. (paratroop)?

- a. HUTA (穂田), KASHIRAI (歌志内), for raids on a full
scale; (Washiburi)
- b. IMIZAWA (今沢) and YUBARI (由利) for raids on
a small scale;
- c. TSUKIMAWA (月形), SHINJOSU (新吉田), and KIWANTAI
(木幡), Spots where DESALTO (デサルト) are
expected to land.

① 3) Maritime Riot and Sabotage Program. (Formed at Iwamizawa and Sugimoto,
in February, 1951)

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a) Objectives

Creation of riots simultaneous to landing of Soviet paratroopers.
Destruction of important facilities.
Establishment of Administrative, Defense, Transportation, and Communication Means, including Seizure of Hydro-electric sources.
(The names, places, and other necessary matters in this connection are under investigation.)

b) Headquarters

IMAMURA

Makodate District

Muroran
Kushiro
Sapporo
Asahibashi
Hokkaido
Otaru

1. Plan for the destruction of the TAKIGAWA (竹小牧).


Paper Mfg. Factory.
Destruction of the SHIICHIKO (支笏) Lake Hydroelectric Power Supply.

2. Establishment of the ISHIGARI District Special Sabotage Operations Unit (24 August, 1951)

Commander: IDA (依田) 
Officers in charge of Intelligence Operations and Propaganda:

ARAKI (荒木) and three other men.

Layout:



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(ZUL-74; PD-345)

SECURITY INFORMATION

Covert Operations in the Ishigaki District

SCOUTS AREA

MUTA Area

KOBIRA

① TAKIGAWA MURAKI
KASIHAI SHISESHI
SURIKAWA KAMISHIBAI
SCORCHI ASIRI
KIMSTAKAWA

MUTA KINOSHITA

YAMIZAKA MITSUJI BAIKETSU
YAYOI INOSHIBETSU
KIFUNI HOROUCHI

MIRUTO

MANJI

YUBARI Area

KOBIRA

② SEIKAKOTANI SEINJUBARI
SHISESHIWA KIYODAI YUBARI
KOBANE KUZUZAWA
HOSOKAWA KATAMICHI

6. Electric Sources: Zonal Destruction Operations.

(KOBIRA: 田中, a Korean from Tagon City.)

DOYA (伊豆谷), SHICHIU Lake, KETSU, OJUPARI, Lake KUN (弓ヶ谷), Lake KISSEI, the AKASHIO River, the ISHIBENI River, Plant, KIGORAI (coal power), AKAE Machi (coal power in the vicinity of ISAHIMAWA.)

c. Intelligence Operation, Directives, and Organization.

- 1) Investigation of Plantations on the Ishigaki Plain.
- 2) MADSU Hot Springs (KAM: ra-u-u)
- 3) Alta Operation (KAM: a-i-ta)
- 4) Seamen's Groups and Local Groups
- 5) Submarine Cable (Information from Oral: HADA Islands, two Dances, OCHIYU)

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SANKEI SHIMPO (S. Gush of KOMIYAI), KANTOHA - KANTOHA
JOINT - KANTOHA.

6) Establishment of Far East Cominform at Nambetsu, ()

7) Cominform Intelligence Operations Units EQ in Hakodate

Nemuro, Ashijiri, Nambetsu, Hakodate, Otaru, Hakodate, Muroran,
Sapporo, Kushiro.

8) Investigation of Hydro-electric supply plant at lake Shikotsu and
of Communist Influence there.

9) The Hokkaido Line: (Hokkaido - Main Routes, "out of the" maritime
organization ships ("orgs"))

Accord-Hakodate Ferry Steamers: Doya Maru and Yoki Maru

Hakodate - Tokyo (Osaka Commercial Steamship Co., OSAKA SHOSHO K.K.)

Kushiro - Tokyo (Japan Steamship Co., NIPPON SHOSHO K.K.)

Otaru - Tokyo (same company)

Otaru - Kushiro (伏木 - 鹿島) (Japan Sea
Steamship Co., NIKKO KAI KISEI K.K.)

KUSHIRO - HIGATA - Kushiro (San-i Company, 三井) ()

10) Maritime Organizational Ships ("orgs")

Tomakomai (Rishiri, KUNIYAMI, KUNIYAM - coal fields, all for investi-
gation and intelligence-gathering activities.)

Muroran (same)

Hakodate (Hakodate, Kanai (函館), Shiri, Ezo, and Iagumo,
Otaru (Sapporo, Kutchan, entire coal fields)

Tomarijuku (Iagumo, Fukagawa, Arashikawa, Misaki, Torano)

Mihama (unknown)

Ashibari (Engaru, Ryubashiba, Iitate, Mihoro, Shari.)

Nemuro

Kushiro (Atsukashii, Shirobetsu, Oshiro, Shiri, Nambetsu.)

① 4. Conclusion

1) The support for the JCP has been reduced and will not be
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(U.S. 752, 2D-345)

of public opinion favoring rearmament, build-up of military power, etc., after signing of the Peace Treaty in San Francisco, with the general tendency towards restoration of the Japanese empire.

- 2) Investigations by means of suppressive control on several occasions have had a heavy effect - as a result of these successes, the police force has been strengthened several times.
- 3) Gradual improvement of the food conditions and other aspects of livelihood.
- 4) A large portion of farmers, agricultural villagers, and others can be freed from the domination of Communist and other government aided organizations to them. Since only 500 officers of the National Rural Police and only three companies of the National Police Reserve are stationed in the eastern section of Hokkaido at present, propaganda operations have been undertaken for the strengthening of the police force as much as possible.

In addition, a civilian defense program is contemplated for 1952.

(Date of Info for para. 1-6: as of mid-October, 1951; Date Acquired: 27 Nov 1951)

7. MATSUKE Yoshitane returned from Hokkaido by plane on November 26, 1951, and then engaged in conversations with the various personages who came to Hokkaido. It became evident that although he had given some time to discussion of the intelligence operations in Hokkaido of MATSUKE's organization, he had spent most of his thirty days in Hokkaido merely gathering information on the situation, most of which he hoped to publish in the paper in lobbying through AS. III. Hitoshi, Democratic Party Leader, in the interests of strengthening Hokkaido defenses and calling attention to defense problems there. He went back to Hokkaido at MATSUKE's insistence on 1 December, 1951.

(Date of info for para. 7: 26-30 Nov 1951; Date Acquired: 15 Dec 1951)

MEMORANDUM

NOTES

REMARKS

1. Field Comment: Cf. ZUL-752. In the light of later developments, it appears more likely that MATSUKE was endeavoring to be polite with his friend, by inviting him to some of the briefings, but definitely hoped to keep him from the more detailed discussions. Cf. 2 & 3 below.
2. Field Comment: It was concerning these documents copied by [redacted] body employed the operational strategy outlined in ZUL-752 & ZUL-753 to have been taken already from a non-MATSUKE source in order to give an excuse for investigating further the MATSUKE Hokkaido network, and as excuse to borrow said document copies for photostat, and to use the same as excuse to keep the [redacted] from the [redacted] [redacted] would say about this later. Matsuке told that the [redacted] page in [redacted] did not develop, but that it [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] for this reason he made no attempt to [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] of it exists, it can be used [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

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quite likely that although HARUKE gave this briefing sheet to Source, he may have been instructed to keep verbal details to himself.

3. Main Comment: It is a pity that we do not possess FUJIWARA's detailed verbal material from this outline, because it shows the framework of some interesting reportable material. Because we do not have the additional facts around the outline, we have not separated this off. Whether HARUKE's account is valid, whether HARUKE was holding out on Source or even whether Source is holding out on us, in any event, there is enough for comparison purposes. This has been copied from Source's copy as closely as practical.

4. HARUKE's interesting whirlwind trip to Tokyo at the end of November will be described in a separate report since it was concerned with a variety of other matters as well. That was sure chiefly because HARUKE did not limit himself to assigned tasks which we felt worth noting here.

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